This paper studies a model with one principal and two agents where one agent can gather information that is valuable for the principal's project choice and the other agent provides effort to the chosen project. Defining authority as the right to choose a project and contract with the agent who does not directly contract with the principal, we ask when the principal can benefit from delegating authority to one of the agents. We show that beneficial delegation is possible when complete contracts cannot be written and authority is delegated to the information gatherer. The benefits of delegation stem from either efficiency gains or reduction in rent to the information gatherer. This can be viewed as a reasonable portrayal of a typical corporate hierarchy where top managers are delegated the authority to make strategic decisions and to contract with other employees.
Introduction
The so-called separation of ownership and control (Berle and Means, 1932; Fama and Jensen, 1983) refers to the fact that the nominal owners of corporations -shareholders -delegate authority to managers. The authority is vested in several important dimensions for the top managers of corporations. They make strategic decisions that set directions for corporations, employ subordinates, and contract with external suppliers. These multiple dimensions of authority are a deciding factor for the organizational structure of modern corporations. Rather than a set of two-tier hierarchies in which owners are at the top of each two-tier hierarchy, modern corporations are often organized as multi-tier hierarchies where managers are placed between owners and other stakeholders.
(1) Chandler (1977 Chandler ( , 1990 ) attributes such a transformation of family-oriented 'personal capitalism' to 'managerial capitalism' in the US to a sharp increase in demand for, and supply of professional, qualified managers as corporations become larger with increasingly sophisticated operations. The resulting modern business enterprise, according to Chandler, is an organization with many distinct operating units that are managed by a hierarchy of professional, salaried executives. In such organizations, shareholders hire top managers -through boards -and managers, in turn, hire subordinates or contract with external suppliers.
The purpose of this paper is to propose a model of modern corporate hierarchy described above. Specifically we ask three related questions. First, why are multi-tier hierarchies, rather than multiple two-tier hierarchies, often the norm? That is, why is hierarchical delegation a dominant form of organizational structure over centralization? Second, why are managers, instead of other stakeholders, at the center of the multi-tier hierarchy? And third, what does this imply about the nature of incentives provided to managers? In answering these questions, we highlight the manager's role as information gatherer and decision maker, and formalize when and why shareholders can benefit from delegating authority to the manager, not to other parties. Before we outline our model and summarize the main results, we offer some discussions on how the manager's role has been viewed in the relevant literature.
Many early writers have stressed information gathering and decision making as the manager's key role. In his classic work, Simon (1977) argues that the manager's most important role is gathering, processing information,
(1) Separation of ownership and control in this sense, although not universally the case, is most prevalent in the Anglo-American system of corporate governance. See La Porta et al. (1999) . and making decisions based on this.
(2) He writes:
Executives and their staffs spend a large fraction of their time surveying the economic, technical, political and social environment to identify new conditions that call for new actions. They probably spend an even larger fraction of their time [...] , seeking to invent, design, and develop possible courses of action for handling situations where a decision is needed (Simon, 1977, p. 40) . Radner (1992 Radner ( , 1993 ) also treats information processing and decision making as the manager's main task, distinct from the roles played by other employees. According to him, managing is a specialized activity, synonymous to decision making, distinct from 'production'. The manager's role as a decision maker is legitimized by authority, which can be defined as the 'power to make decisions which guide the actions of another' (Simon, 1997, p. 179) . Clear from Simon's definition is that the manager's authority includes that which involves contracting with other parties.
Granted that the manager's role is information gathering and decision making, a natural question is why owners voluntarily delegate authority to the manager. On efficiency grounds at least, it seems that authority to make decisions should rest with the party who can gather or has necessary information and the ability to use it.
(3) Indeed, a typical explanation for delegation in corporations is based on the manager's expertise and the ensuing benefits of specialization. Jensen and Murphy (1990) put it aptly:
Managers often have better information than shareholders and boards in identifying investment opportunities and assessing the profitability of potential projects; indeed, the expectation that managers will make superior investment decisions explains why shareholders relinquish decision rights over their assets by purchasing common stocks (Jensen and Murphy, 1990, p. 251 ).
Underlying the above explanation is a tenet that the manager's information cannot be communicated without a friction, be it due to technological reasons and/or conflict of interests, (4) since otherwise, shareholders or boards would be able to make decisions based on the manager's information. While the efficiency benefits from delegation are reasonable to expect, presence of potential conflict renders it not at all clear whether a sufficiently large frac-(2) Case studies by Mintzberg (1973) provide rich supporting evidence for this. (3) See, for example, Milgrom and Roberts (1992) , or Baron and Kreps (1999) . (4) The benefits of hierarchies facing the costs of communicating and processing information have been put forward by Arrow (1974) and Williamson (1983) among many others.
that the manager's most important role is gathering, processing information, tion of the efficiency benefits can flow back to shareholders for them to opt for delegation. In particular, if delegation results in too much rent dissipated to the manager, then shareholders would be worse off despite overall efficiency gains. We delineate when and how delegation can be devised to fend off such adverse outcomes and benefit shareholders.
We now sketch the key features of our model and the intuition behind the main result. Consider a firm that comprises an owner and two heterogenous agents. The firm may undertake one of two potential investment projects and the return from each project depends on the state of nature. One agent can, at a cost, privately acquire information about the state of nature, which is critical for optimal project choice. We call this agent the manager. The other agent, whom we call the worker, can exert effort that can increase the likelihood that the chosen project is successful. An organizational structure specifies allocation of authority, which is defined as the right to choose a project and contract with the agent who does not directly contract with the owner. In exercising authority, the party can demand communication of information from the manager by cheap-talk if, of course, the manager is not the party with authority.
Our focus is on the organizational structure and contracts that maximize the owner's expected payoff. In centralization, the owner retains authority while in delegation, authority is delegated to one of the agents. We consider two types of contracting environment, both subject to limited liability. In the first environment called complete contracting, communication of manager's information, project choice, and the return from the chosen project are all contractible upon. Thus complete contracting refers to the most general direct mechanism which we treat as a benchmark case. In the second environment called partial contracting, only the return is contractible upon. As elaborated in Section 3.3, our rationale for this type of partial contracting stems from an argument in the spirit of the incomplete contracting literature against variables other than accounting profits or stock price in the corporate world. This is also the most restricted contracting environment where one can still consider explicit performance-based incentives for both agents. We show that, in the complete contracting environment, the owner cannot benefit from delegation, hence centralization is her preferred organi-(5) One can think of other contracting possibilities that we do not consider. For example, mechanisms in which the owner can condition contracts on the allocation of authority, and contracts in which payments to the two agents can be made interdependent. In the context of the model we study, we can show that these contracting possibilities allow the owner to implement the same outcome that she does with complete contracting, hence delegation can never be optimal. However, we do not think that these are very realistic possibilities. zational structure. Although contracts are subject to limited liability in our model, the (weak) dominance by centralization over any other organizational structures is a consequence of the revelation principle extended to the environment with both private information and private actions (Myerson, 1982) . Moreover, if authority is delegated to the worker, the owner is strictly worse off due to limited liability. This is because the worker's incentive problem conditional on the manager's information is the same under centralization and delegation, whence conferring authority to the worker results in double marginalization of rent (McAfee and McMillan, 1995; Mookherjee, 2006) .
In the partial contracting environment, however, we establish that delegating authority to the manager can benefit the owner although delegation to the worker does not help. The benefits of delegating authority to the manager come from two sources.
First, if the two projects differ sufficiently in their return distributions, in centralization the manager may find it optimal to not acquire information and send his preferred message to the owner based on the prior, even if social optimum dictates that the manager acquire information and that different projects be undertaken together with different levels of worker's effort contingent on the information acquired. This is because the manager's contract depends only on the return regardless of the chosen project and cannot internalize the worker's effort cost. Since the manager's communication is uninformative in this case, the owner optimally bypasses the manager. Consequently, centralization results in a suboptimal investment decision and inefficient effort provision by the worker. Delegating authority to the manager can change this as it makes him a residual claimant in the subcontracting stage. Thus the manager's payoff in delegation is dependent on the worker's contract he would offer, and indirectly on project choice as well. This motivates the manager to acquire information since proper exercise of authority requires information acquisition, which, albeit at a cost, can pay off since it can increase his residual claim.
(6) Thus delegation can result in an optimal investment decision and efficient effort provision by the worker. Such efficiency gains from delegation are weighed against the costs of motivating the manager. We show that delegation is more likely to dominate centralization if the manager's cost of information acquisition becomes smaller, the manager's information becomes more valuable, and the worker's cost of effort becomes larger.
(6) In a similar vein but in the costly verification environment, Choe (1998) shows that the contract designed by the informed party can reduce the verification cost compared to the one designed by the uninformed party. The reason is that the informed party, in an attempt to maximize the value of his residual claim, designs the contract to give himself truth-telling incentives.
Second, even when centralization can induce information acquisition and implement an optimal investment decision, delegation of authority to the manager can benefit the owner as it can reduce the rent that the owner needs to pay the manager to motivate him to acquire and communicate information truthfully. Once again, the residual claim given to the manager in the subcontracting stage enables the owner to provide tighter incentives to the manager, thereby reducing the cost of observing the manager's incentive constraints under centralization.
To summarize, our approach is distinguished from most existing studies on delegation and hierarchy reviewed in Section 2 in the following key aspect: Rather than both of the agents provide inputs for a given production technology, in our model one agent (manager) contributes by acquiring soft information on the available technologies that dictates how the productive input of the other agent (worker) may be put to best use. Conditional on the manager's information, the worker's input can be induced efficiently in the standard manner, so the worker is paid an efficiency wage in our model. The acquisition of information, however, may be more efficiently motivated if the information acquirer bears more fully the consequences of the acquired information, in particular, when he has the authority to subcontract with the input supplier. This is because information has differing implications on the efficient use of the worker's input. Indeed we show that the principal may find it optimal to delegate authority to the manager, and characterize the circumstances under which this is the case. The multi-tier hierarchy thus identified, i.e., with the information acquirer in the middle, may be regarded as a reasonable portrayal of modern corporate hierarchy. This stands in contrast with other studies on hierarchy, where there is no a priori reason why a particular agent should be at the center of the multi-tier hierarchy because the agents' roles are essentially modelled symmetrically. The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the related literature. Section 3 describes the model. The case of complete contracting is studied in Section 4 while Section 5 is on the partial contracting environment. Section 6 compares centralization with delegation to the manager. Section 7 concludes the paper. The appendix contains the proofs of the results that are not central to the exposition of our main ideas.
Related Literature
The main focus of this paper, namely an optimal multi-tier hierarchy, is directly related to a large body of literature on incentive-based explanations (7) Baliga and Sjöström (1998) is a notable exception, as discussed in Section 2. of hierarchy.
(8) We refer the readers to Mookherjee (2006) for an excellent review and discuss only briefly where our paper stands relative to the existing studies. For convenience, we divide the literature broadly into two categories.
First, many studies adopt the conventional adverse selection model with one principal and at least two agents, where each agent has private information about his production cost. In an environment where the revelation principle applies, centralization cannot be dominated by any other mechanisms. Thus hierarchy can be equivalent to centralization at best. The equivalence of centralization and hierarchy under some conditions is shown, among others, by Baron and Besanko (1992) , Gilbert and Riordan (1995) , and Melumad, Mookherjee and Reichelstein (1995) . Faure-Grimaud, Laffont and Martimort (2003) also show the equivalence when one of the agents is replaced by a supervisor, whose primary role is to observe the productive agent's cost information. When conditions for the revelation principle do not hold, hierarchy can dominate centralization. This is shown by Laffont and Martimort (1998) when there are limits on communication and the possibility of collusion between agents, and by Reichelstein (1992, 1997) under restrictions on message space. On the other hand, Mookherjee and Tsumagari (2004) generalize the model in Laffont and Martimort (1998) to show that hierarchy is in general strictly dominated by centralization due to double marginalization of rents.
(9) The latter is also shown by McAfee and McMillan (1995) when contracts are subject to limited liability.
Second, a number of papers study the standard moral hazard setting with one principal and two agents where each agent takes hidden action. Baliga and Sjöström (1998), and Macho-Stadler and Pérez-Castrillo (1998) show the equivalence of hierarchy and a centralized mechanism subject to the possibility of collusion. An additional conclusion of Baliga and Sjöström relates to the pattern of hierarchical delegation: when one agent can freely observe the other agent's action but not vice versa, the agent with superior information should be delegated the contracting authority. While not (8) Other strands of literature on multi-tier hierarchy are concerned with the issue of monitoring and loss of control (Williamson, 1967; Calvo and Wellisz, 1978; Qian, 1994) , or the information-processing capacity of hierarchy (Radner, 1993; Van Zandt, 1999) . Hart and Moore (2005) focus on the allocation of authority within hierarchies but without the element of incentives.
(9) The main difference between Laffont and Martimort (1998) and Mookherjee and Tsumagari (2004) is that, in the former, the cost types are binary and the bargaining power in the side-contracting at the collusion stage is fixed exogenously. In Mookherjee and Tsumagari, the bargaining power in the collusion stage is determined endogenously by the initial contract offered by the principal. Because of this, the principal can control the outcome from collusion to some extent.
directly concerned with multi-tier hierarchies, Itoh (1992 Itoh ( , 1993 ) also studies a multiple-agent moral hazard environment to examine conditions under which the principal can benefit by allowing coalition of agents, when agents can monitor each other. These findings can also be regarded as supportive of delegation over centralization when agents have informational advantages over the principal.
Our paper shares common interest with the above studies, but differs from them in motivation and modelling approach. Our goal is to understand the emergence of corporate hierarchy where decision maker and input supplier are linked in a hierarchical fashion. This led us to introduce two heterogeneous agents, an information gatherer and an input supplier. In line with the manager's role as described by Simon (1977) , Radner (1992 Radner ( , 1993 , and Jensen and Murphy (1990) , we show that an optimal hierarchy should necessarily have the information gatherer at the middle tier of the hierarchy. In an optimal hierarchy, the information gatherer has authority to make decisions and contract with the other agent. In contrast, the agent in the middle tier of the hierarchy in the above studies is not a decision maker but only observes the other agent's hidden cost parameter or action, which he communicates to the principal or uses in designing the contract for the other agent. Such a role is akin to monitoring or supervision. As the earlier quotation from Simon (1997) suggests, the manager's role is to gather information external to the firm and make strategic decisions, going beyond that of monitoring or supervising subordinates.
A number of recent studies have been concerned with the allocation of authority within an organization in tackling coordination problems (Athey and Roberts, 2001; Dessein, Garicano and Gertner, 2007; Alonso, Dessein and Matouschek, 2008; Rantakari, 2008; Friebel and Raith, 2010) . For example, Alonso, Dessein and Matouschek (2008) and Rantakari (2008) show that coordination can be achieved through cheap talk communication between division managers when they are given the decision authority, the benefits of which increase with decentralization. However, these studies are not directly concerned with multi-tier hierarchies. On the other hand, Choe and Ishiguro (2008) show that, in the absence of such communication, hierarchical delegation can be another way to improve coordination relative to complete decentralization. These studies typically follow the property rights literatureà la Grossman-Hart-Moore or the control rights literature initiated by Aghion and Tirole (1997) . Thus there is no formal contract except for the allocation of decision authority and consequently, decision-relevant preferences are given exogenously and so are the sources of conflict of interest. Our paper is also concerned with the allocation of authority but differs in that it incorporates both the decision and contracting authority, with contracting authority playing the main role. With formal contracts and no limit on communication, the decision authority turns out not to have much bite but the contracting authority does matter because the agreed terms of contract endogenously determine the degree of conflict of interest and thereby, influence the behavior of other parties. In particular, we show how delegation of contracting authority can benefit the principal when it is to the information gatherer, but hurts when it is to the input supplier.
Finally, the aspect of information gathering by the manager in our model can be related to several studies on strategic information gathering. Crémer and Khalil (1992) allow the possibility for the agent to gather information after the contract is offered but before it is signed. In case unfavorable states are observed, the agent can reject the contract. They show that the principal offers a contract that induces the agent not to gather information, hence information remains symmetric. In related papers, Crémer and Khalil (1994) , and Crémer, Khalil and Rochet (1998) consider a situation where the agent can gather costly information before a contract is offered. Acquiring information does not have social value in these studies, as it will become known at no cost once the parties sign a contract. Therefore, the main reason for socially wasteful information gathering is for the agent to improve his bargaining position. A general message from these studies is that such pre-contractual information gathering leads to deviation from the first-best efficient allocation. Information gathering in our paper is quite different: the manager's information is valuable for project choice and subsequent contracting with the worker, hence the optimal contract for the manager is structured to provide incentives for information gathering.
The Model

Players, Technology and Outcomes
There are three parties, a principal (she) and two heterogeneous agents whom we call the manager (he) and the worker (he). The principal has two projects, called A and B. The return from either project is random with a binary support X := {x, 0} where x > 0. We call the event of positive return a success. The probability of success from project A depends on the underlying state, θ, and the worker's action which is a binary choice between "work" or "shirk". Specifically, the state θis a binary random variable assuming θ 1 and θ 2 with probabilities π ∈ (0, 1) and 1 − π, respectively, and the probability of success from project A is p i ∈ (0, 1) in state θ i if the worker chooses work where i = 1, 2; If the worker chooses shirk, the probability of success is 0 in both states.
(10) The monetary equivalent cost of work for the worker is > 0 and that of shirk is normalized to 0. Project B does not require the worker's input and has a success probability of q ∈ (0, 1) regardless of state.
That the return from project B has the same support as project A is to ensure that the return does not reveal which project was chosen.
(11) Also the assumption that project B does not require the worker's input is for the sake of simplicity. What is essential is that the worker's optimal action is necessarily state-dependent, of which the simplest case is where only project A requires the worker's input.
The return from either project is publicly observable and verifiable, while the worker's effort is private information. After a state θ∈ {θ 1 ,θ 2 } is realized, the manager is the only party that can observe a signal that is correlated with the state, which will be called information gathering. Information gathering is costly to the manager, and its monetary equivalent cost is c > 0. For simplicity we assume that the signal is a perfect predictor of the state, i.e., the manager observes the true state θif he gathers information. If the manager does not gather information, then he observes nothing and we denote this null signal by ∅, so the set of all possible signals is Θ := {θ 1 ,θ 2 , ∅}.
The precise order of events differs depending on organizational structures, which will be described in the next subsection. In any organizational structure, each agent is offered a contract that specifies compensation contingent on contractible variables. We assume that both agents are risk-neutral and maximize the expected compensation net of any cost. The principal is also risk-neutral and maximizes the expected return net of compensation payments. The aforementioned structure of the game is common knowledge. Our focus is on the principal's problem of choosing an organizational structure that is best for her.
Next, we introduce restrictions on parameter values that would make the problem of contracting with multiple agents interesting and non-trivial. If p i x − ≥qx for i = 1, 2, it is optimal to undertake project A and induce work regardless of state. If p i x − ≤qx for i = 1, 2, on the other hand, it is optimal to choose project B regardless of state, in which case the worker's input is irrelevant. In both cases the manager's information has no value and the solution to the principal's problem is trivial. An interesting case of multi- (10) This simplifies notation and analysis. Our main qualitative results are robust to different success probabilities when the worker shirks, as long as they are sufficiently small. (11) As will become clear, this assumption of 'no moving support' limits the set of feasible contracts the principal can use when only return is contractible. the manager's information. Therefore, we assume, without loss of generality,
Then, the ex post efficiency is obtained in the following outcome:
(C1) Project A is chosen and the worker works in θ 1 , and project B is undertaken in θ 2 . The total expected surplus is
For this outcome to be implemented, the manager should gather information, so that project A (B, resp.) is chosen in θ 1 (θ 2 , resp.), followed by the worker choosing work if θ=θ 1 . This outcome is indeed socially optimal if the extra surplus from the use of manager's information exceeds the cost of his gathering information, c. However, whether the principal would wish to implement (C1) depends on the cost of inducing the manager to gather information and report truthfully, which may be larger than c due to limited liability. If it is too high, then the principal will implement an alternative outcome. To see what other outcomes the principal needs to consider, notice first that, whenever the manager's information is used, the worker should be induced to work for project A only in θ 1 since qx > p 2 x − . That is, any outcome in which the manager's information is used should necessarily be (C1). Thus the only other outcomes the principal needs to consider in addition to (C1) are the ones in which the manager's information is not used. There are two such outcomes that are not dominated: (C2) Project A is undertaken regardless of the state and the worker works.
The total expected surplus is
Project B is undertaken regardless of the state and consequently, the worker's input is irrelevant. The total expected surplus is V 3 := qx.
The principal can easily implement (C2), e.g., by offering a null contract to the manager, always choosing project A, and offering the worker a contract specifying a payment of w = /[πp 1 +(1−π)p 2 ] in case of success and w = 0 otherwise. Hence, the principal's expected payoff from implementing (C2) is equal to the entire surplus V 2 . The principal can also implement (C3) trivially by always choosing project B without engaging either agent, whence extracting the total surplus V 3 . These two outcomes are the principal's fall-back options. We present our analysis assuming that (C2) is a better option, i.e.,
agent contracting thus arises when the worker's optimal action depends on for expositional ease, (12) but our results do not change qualitatively even if
Finally we assume V 1 > V 2 since, otherwise, the multi-agent contracting problem is reduced to the standard principal-agent problem between the principal and the worker. This is because V 1 is the maximum possible surplus the principal can attain by engaging the manager while she can always secure V 2 by directly contracting with the worker without the manager's information.
The term (1−π)(qx+ −p 2 x) shows the potential benefits from using the manager's information: θ 2 is observed with probability 1 − π, in which case it is optimal to choose project B for the expected return of qx, instead of choosing project A and hiring the worker, which returns p 2 x − . Given that the manager's information gathering cost is c, Assumption 3 means that the manager's information is valuable.
Note that the above assumptions imply that π is neither too large nor too small. If it is so large that θ=θ 1 almost certainly, then there is no need for the manager's information and the principal is better off implementing (C2). Similarly, if π is too small, then θ=θ 2 almost certainly, in which case (C3) can be the best option for the principal.
(14) Given Assumption 2, (C2) is the principal's fall-back option, which she can implement through centralized contracting. Therefore, in the sequel we focus on various organizational structures that the principal can adopt to implement (C1).
Authority and Organizational Structure
Based on the possible events described above, we now discuss various organizational structures that can be adopted to govern contracts among the three parties. Since the manager's information gathering and the worker's effort choice are private, there are three remaining actions that may be governed by contracts: selecting a project between A and B, contracting with the manager, and contracting with the worker. An organizational structure specifies allocation of authority as to who takes which of these three actions.
(12) If V 3 > V 2 , the principal's incentive compatibility is harder to verify for the centralized contracts that implement (C1) in the partial contracting environment that we analyze in Section 5. Consequently, the characterization of such contracts is more complicated than that when V 2 > V 3 , i.e., Proposition 3. By centralization we mean an organizational structure in which the principal takes all three actions. In terms of timing, the manager's contract should be offered before the manager gathers information since, otherwise, the manager would not gather information due to the hold-up problem (i.e., the cost of information gathering would be already sunk at the time of contracting). On the other hand, the worker's contract can be offered either before or after the principal makes a project choice decision. However, since the worker's input is needed only in project A and our focus is on (C1), it is easy to see that the worker's incentive problem turns out to be the same in both cases. So, we assume that the worker's contract is offered after project choice. Thus events unfold in the following order in centralization. First, the principal offers a contract to the manager. Second, a state is realized and the manager makes a decision on information gathering. Third, the manager communicates his information to the principal by cheap-talk, based on which the principal makes a project choice. If project A is chosen, then the principal offers a contract to the worker, who then chooses his effort level. Finally, return from the chosen project realizes and payments are made according to the contracts.
Being the ultimate residual claimant, the principal always retains the authority to contract with at least one of the agents. By delegation we mean any organizational structure in which the principal contracts with only one of the agents, whom we call the primary agent, so that the primary agent is bestowed the authority to contract with the other agent. When the manager is the primary agent, we call the organizational structure manager delegation and, when the worker is the primary agent, worker delegation. In either case, the contract between the two agents specifies payments from the primary agent, rather than the principal, to the other agent for various contractible contingencies. The key aspect in delegation is hierarchical contracting: in manager delegation, for example, the principal offers a contract to the manager, who in turn offers a contract to the worker.
In either form of delegation, multiple possibilities exist as to with whom the authority resides to decide on project choice. In an earlier version of the paper (Choe and Park, 2010) , we provide a full characterization of all possibilities in this respect, i.e., when it resides with the principal, the manager, or the worker. As unveiled there, it turns out that the three parties have sufficiently aligned interests regarding the project choice so that contracts can be devised to induce the right project choice whoever possesses the decision authority, without distorting other incentive constraints. As a result, allocation of decision authority does not have much bite in the current model and our main results are driven by the allocation of contracting authority. Therefore, in this paper we present our results assuming that the primary agent is endowed with the authority to decide on the project as well as to contract with the other agent. In addition to facilitating the exposition, this assumption carries an intuitive appeal. (15) An inherent issue surrounding delegation is how the principal may credibly commit to allocation of authority to decide and carry out a certain activity to another party. In our context, such commitments can be justified in much the same way as in the property rights literature. As compellingly argued in Dessein (2002) , for example, if the principal has ownership over some critical resources required to undertake either project, she can commit to delegation by granting the use of these critical resources. That is, shareholders may hire a CEO with a contract that entitles him to use the firm's capital to pursue entrepreneurial activities to enhance the firm's value, which include initiating a new project and adjusting labor force accordingly. Indeed such a commitment is commonly observed in widely-held public corporations where shareholders' interference in management decisions is limited other than through the election of the board of directors.
To recap, the timing of events in the two delegated structures is as follows. In manager delegation, the principal offers a contract to the manager, who then decides on information gathering. The manager chooses a project and, when he chooses project A, he offers a contract to the worker, who then selects his effort level. Note that there is no communication of the manager's information in this case. In worker delegation, the principal offers a contract to the worker. After this, the worker offers a contract to the manager, who then decides on information gathering. This is followed by the manager's communication with the worker, which is followed by the worker's project choice decision. Finally the worker selects his effort level if he chooses project A. We think that manager delegation depicts, albeit crudely, multitier hierarchical organizations prevalent in the corporate arena, and it is at the center of our analysis. Although worker delegation is hard to justify on practical ground, we analyze it as well for the sake of comparison and with a view to providing an account of why it is a much less observed structure.
We now introduce some notation that will facilitate subsequent analysis. In doing so, we use subscript p for the principal, m for the manager, and (15) For example, Fama and Jensen (1983, p. 303 ) define decision authority -decision management, in their term -more broadly to include contracting authority. Decision management includes generation of proposals for resource utilization and structuring of contracts, and their implementation. Since making and implementing a decision typically requires entering into contractual relations with various stakeholders, it would make more sense for a party with decision authority to also have contracting authority than to separate these two types of authority.
w for the worker. We denote the manager's information gathering decision by δ m ∈ {0, 1} where δ m = 1 if the manager gathers information. When the manager chooses a project in manager delegation, his project choice decision is denoted by a mapping ψ m :Θ→ {A, B}. In other organizational structures, the communication of manager's information is denoted by a mapping γ m :Θ→ Θ where Θ denotes the space of cheap-talk messages; and the project choice decision by either the principal or the worker, depends on the manager's report and is denoted by a mapping ψ j : Θ → {A, B} for j = p, w. The worker's effort choice is relevant only when project A is chosen, which is denoted by δ w ∈{0, 1} where δ w = 1 if the worker chooses work.
Contracting Environment
The outcome from each organizational structure depends on specific contracting environment. We consider two types of contracting environment depending on which variables are contractible upon. Since the manager's information gathering and the worker's action are both private, there are potentially three remaining variables that can be used for contracting purposes: the return from the project, the identity of chosen project, and the manager's report regarding the state he may have observed. We focus on limited liability contracts that have a lower bound of zero for payments to the manager and the worker in each contingency.
In the first environment, called complete contracting, all three variables are contractible upon. Thus the manager's contract in centralization is represented by s : Θ × {A, B} × X → + where s(θ, k, r) specifies a nonnegative payment to the manager when his report isθ∈ Θ = {θ 1 ,θ 2 , ∅}, project k ∈ {A, B} is chosen, and return from the project is r ∈ X; Similarly, the worker's contract is represented by w : Θ × {A, B} × X → + . In manager delegation, since there is no communication, the principal offers a contract s : {A, B} × X → + to the manager, who in turn offers a contract w : {A, B}×X → + to the worker. In worker delegation, since the manager communicates with the worker, the principal offers a contract w : {A, B} × X → + to the worker, who in turns offers a contract s : Θ × {A, B} × X → + to the manager. In the complete contracting environment, the principal can costlessly and fully commit to a centralized mechanism that governs organizational activities ranging from communication to project choice, and to compensation for each agent. Thus one may expect the revelation principle to apply, implying that the principal cannot benefit from delegating authority to either agent, as is confirmed in Section 4 below. To explain why a delegated organizational structure may emerge as the principal's preferred choice, we need to depart from the complete contracting environment.
In the second environment, called partial contracting, (16) we assume that the manager's communication is soft, and so is project choice. Thus only the return is contractible upon. Accordingly, we denote a contract by (s x , s 0 ) ∈ 2 + for the manager where s r is the payment when return is r ∈ {x, 0}; and similarly, (w x , w 0 ) ∈ 2 + for the worker. The main motivation for looking at this type of contracting environment comes from our focus on corporate hierarchies. In typical corporate hierarchies, headquarters can face a vast amount of information flow that can be used for decision making, and making an ex ante commitment to contracts based on this would be either infeasible or impracticable.
(17) Likewise, corporate decision making can cover many different areas with differing levels of complexity, hence incorporating them in ex ante contracts would be next to impossible.
(18) On the other hand, there are easily observable performance indicators such as accounting profits or stock price, which correspond to the return from project in our model. Indeed a typical compensation contract for managers in Anglo-American type corporations comprises a base salary and performance pay, the latter almost always based on stock price or accounting profits, rather than other input variables such as the manager's reports or decisions. In the partial contracting environment, the principal's ability to control organizational activities is limited relative to complete contracting. Thus the principal may want to use the allocation of authority as an additional tool in extracting surplus. While the principal may find it infeasible or uneconomical to write complete contracts, she may still be able to commit to the allocation of authority as explained in the previous section. In this sense, our partial contracting environment lies between those studied in the classical mechanism design literature, in which no issue of authority allo-(16) We use the term 'partial' contracting instead of 'incomplete' contracting since the latter usually refers to the case where allocation of authority is the only contractible variable and explicit performance-based incentives are absent. (17) Dessein (2002, p. 831 ) also argues that, even when private information can be verified, it is often very time-consuming to do so. Therefore, in fast changing industries, the benefits may not outweigh the costs in terms of incurred delays in decision making and the heavy burden put on managerial attention, in which case information is de facto soft. (2009) report that less than 20% of CEO pay is in salary, more than 50% is in stock-based compensation such as restricted stock or stock options, while the rest is in bonus that typically depends on stock price -stock appreciation rights -or accounting profits. Murphy (1999) provides more details on the determinants of bonus.
cation arises, and the incomplete contracting literature, in which allocation of authority is the main focus since contracts in any meaningful sense are absent. An additional implication stemming from our analysis is that delegation and contactual arrangement can complement each other to steer the agents' behavior more in line with the principal's interest. (20) Between the two contracting environments described above lies another possibility where project choice and return are contractible upon but the manager's report is not. As will become clear as we go on, optimal contracts in this case lead to the same outcome and the same payoffs for all the parties as in the case of complete contracting. While this is due to the binary nature of the manager's information and project choice in our model, the equivalence continues to hold as long as the cardinality of the manager's information set is not less than the cardinality of project choice decision. For this reason, in the sequel we take it granted that partial contracting refers to the case that only return is contractible upon.
In what follows we study the organizational structure and contracts that the principal can use to implement her preferred outcome in the two contracting environments. An organizational structure is said to dominate another organizational structure if the principal's equilibrium expected payoff from the former is larger than that from the latter.
Complete Contracting
Since the principal can implement (C2) in centralization without leaving any rent to either agent as shown above, and the outcome (C3) is inferior due to Assumption 2, the principal's problem is the choice between outcomes (C1) and (C2). In particular, she does not need to consider organizational structures other than centralization if she wishes to implement (C2). Delegation may be beneficial only when it implements (C1) at a lower cost than in centralization. Thus, our focus below is on the organizational structure and contracts that implement (C1).
Unless the manager has authority, implementing (C1) requires honest reporting by the manager. Therefore, it suffices to consider Θ = {θ 1 ,θ 2 } whereθ i is interpreted as the message the manager sends when θ=θ i , i = 1, 2. Consequently, the equilibrium communication strategy that implements (C1) is γ m (θ i ) =θ i for i = 1, 2, which we take as granted in the sequel. Note that this applies to the partial contracting environment as well.
In addition, unless the worker has authority, implementing (C1) requires that either the principal or the manager contract with the worker to (20) This resonates with an observation in Dessein (2002, p. 830) , although the core logic of underlying arguments differs substantially.
induce work, conditional on the knowledge that θ=θ 1 and project A is undertaken. Then the worker's contract that implements (C1) is simplified to (w x , w 0 ) where w r is the wage when return is r ∈ X. Since the worker chooses work if and only if w x − w 0 ≥ /p 1 , the optimal contract for the worker is w x = /p 1 and w 0 = 0, whether it is designed by the principal or by the manager. Clearly this contract does not leave any rent to the worker.
Lemma 1 In any organizational structure where the worker does not have authority, the optimal contract for the worker when (C1) is implemented is w x = /p 1 and w 0 = 0 when θ=θ 1 and project A is chosen, and a null contract, i.e., w x = w 0 = 0, when θ=θ 2 .
Centralization
Our focus is on perfect Bayesian equilibria that implement (C1), where we have δ m = 1, γ m (θ i ) =θ i for i = 1, 2, ψ p (θ 1 ) = A,ψ p (θ 2 ) = B, and δ w = 1 only in θ 1 . By Bayes rule, the following beliefs are immediate: the principal believes the true state to be θ i upon receiving a reportθ i from the manager; the worker believes the state to be θ 1 (θ 2 , resp.) upon observing the project choice of A (B, resp.). Since the optimal contract for the worker is as in Lemma 1, it remains to identify the optimal contract for the manager that the principal would choose to implement the outcome specified above. Denoting s To examine the manager's contract that maximizes the principal's payoff, let u(θ|θ) denote the manager's interim expected payoff from reportingθ∈ {θ 1 ,θ 2 } when the true state is θ∈ {θ 1 ,θ 2 }. That is, for i = 1, 2,
Then the manager's expected payoff is
Since the manager first makes a decision on information gathering and then on his reporting strategy, there are two kinds of incentive compatibility (IC) constraints. Interim IC constraints ensure that, once the manager gathered information, he reports observed signals truthfully:
The ex ante IC constraints ensure information gathering. Without gathering information, the manager can reportθ 1 and obtain an expected payoff πu(θ 1 |θ 1 ) + (1 − π)u(θ 1 |θ 2 ), or reportθ 2 and obtain K. Thus the ex ante IC constraints are
Since (4) implies (3) and the worker's payoff is U w = 0 as asserted above, the principal's optimal contracting problem is:
The next proposition provides the solution to (5) and the principal's choice of optimal outcome in centralization with complete contracting. Proof. In the Appendix. The intuition behind the manager's optimal contract that implements (C1) is as follows. The manager's contract needs to control the twin incentives of information gathering and truthful report. To provide incentives for truthful report, the principal needs to reward the manager whenθ 2 is reported, which is given by K = qs negative so that the manager's expected payoff becomes zero.
As discussed above, limited liability is crucial in the principal's choice of which outcome to implement. Limited liability raises the principal's cost of implementing (C1) by limiting the extent to which the manager can be penalized for lying. The information rent the principal has to pay to the manager given limited liability is
π(1−π)(p 1 −p 2 ) , which she does not need to bear when implementing (C2) since she does not use the manager's information then. The value of manager's information comes from implementing (C1), which is given by (1−π)(qx+ −p 2 x)−c. Thus if U m > (1−π)(qx+ −p 2 x)−c, then the principal would bypass the manager and implement (C2). Otherwise, she would implement (C1). If there is no limited liability so that no information rent is needed, then the principal would implement (C1) under centralization due to Assumption 3, which cannot be improved upon in any other organizational structure.
Finally, we note that, as mentioned in the previous section, the above outcome can be also implemented when project choice and return are contractible but the manager's report is not. In this case, consider the manager's contract such that s Ar = s 
Delegation
In the complete contracting environment without communication costs, the revelation principle tells us that a direct, centralized mechanism weakly dominates any other mechanisms. Specifically, we can apply Myerson's (1982) extension of the revelation principle to the environment with both private information and private actions.
(22) However, the additional limited liability (21) The principal's IC constraints for project choice need to be satisfied here because the manager's report is assumed to be not contractible. Note that we did not consider the principal's IC constraints in complete contracting. This is because when the report is contractible, it seems reasonable to presume that the principal can commit to project choice contingent on report. In addition, even if such commitment were not possible, the principal's IC constraints can be verified straightforwardly.
(22) To be precise, Myerson's result applies to our context conditional on the manager gathering information. Since the manager is induced to gather information at the minimum possible cost in centralization, this implies that centralization weakly dominates other mechanisms. constraints in our model allow us to say more than weak dominance as the following proposition shows.
Proposition 2 In the complete contracting environment, centralization is equivalent to manager delegation but dominates worker delegation in implementing (C1).
Proof. In the Appendix. The idea for Proposition 2 is as follows. Observe that the report on the state and project choice are aligned as a one-to-one relationship in the centralized contract that implements (C1). Thus, in manager delegation, unavailability of the report for contracting purposes does not impair the principal's scope of providing incentives to the manager. Consequently, by adding worker's incentive wage to the manager's compensation to be passed on, the principal can induce the same behavior from the manager at the same total cost.
On the other hand, giving authority to the worker is costly to the principal. The reason for this is the cost of inducing the worker to choose project B when the manager reportsθ 2 . In centralization, the worker is not engaged when the manager reportsθ 2 , and the principal needs to satisfy only the manager's IC constraints to truthfully reportθ 2 , which involves rewarding the manager by a positive payment whenθ 2 is truthfully reported. When the worker has authority, the same reward has to be made to the manager by the worker. Since this payment should be included in the primary contract the principal offers the worker, the worker can earn a positive rent by marginally inducing the manager to always reportθ 2 without gathering information, e.g., by offering a contract stipulating a small payment only whenθ 2 is reported. To counter such incentives, the worker's expected payoff whenθ 1 is reported should be made sufficiently positive as well. Since the worker enjoys no rent in centralization, it follows that the principal is strictly worse off in worker delegation. This is akin to what McAfee and McMillan (1995) called 'double marginalization of rent' although their model is distinctly different from ours. Such double marginalization is due to limited liability.
(23) (23) Without limited liability, it is easy to show that centralization is equivalent to both delegated organizational structures. The reason is that double marginalization of rent stems from the information rent to the manager. As shown previously, there is no information rent to the manager when limited liability is relaxed.
Partial Contracting
In the partial contracting environment, although contracts can be written only on the return, there is communication of the manager's information except when the manager has authority. Our focus is again on the principal's expected payoff from implementing (C1) in alternative organizational structures.
Centralization
Suppose (C1) is implemented in centralization with contracts (s x , s 0 ) ∈ 2 + for the manager and (w x , w 0 ) ∈ 2 + for the worker, where w x = /p 1 and w 0 = 0 as in Lemma 1. The manager's ex ante IC constraints are
where (6) ( (7), resp.) ensures that the manager prefers information gathering and truthful reporting to always reportingθ 1 (θ 2 , resp.) without gathering information. It is immediate that the manager's interim IC constraints, (p 1 − q)(s x − s 0 )≥0 and (q − p 2 )(s x − s 0 )≥0, are implied by (6) and (7). Since p 1 > q and p 1 > p 2 by Assumption 1, we divide analysis into two cases. First, if p 2 ≥q, then there does not exist (s x , s 0 ) that satisfies (6) and (7). Thus centralization cannot implement (C1) and the principal's optimal choice is to implement (C2). Second, if q > p 2 , then (6) and (7) imply the following optimal contract for the manager:
(1−π)(q−p 2 ) and (7) is slack. Then it is trivial to verify that the principal's IC constraints for project choice, (1−π)(q−p 2 ) and the principal's expected payoff is V 1 −U m . The principal prefers (C1) to (C2) if and only if (1 − π)(qx + − p 2 x) − c≥U m .
The first part of Proposition 3 shows that, if q≤p 2 then it is impossible to induce the manager to gather information in the partial contracting environment. The intuition is as follows. Given q≤p 2 and that his compensation is based only on return, the manager would prefer to have project A undertaken regardless of the true state if s x > s 0 . On the other hand, he would prefer project B undertaken regardless of the true state if s x ≤s 0 . Thus the value of information is nil from the manager's point of view and, consequently, information gathering cannot be induced. Note that, with complete contracting, the principal has a much better handle on this since the manager's contract can be based on project choice as well. In particular, when compensation is more sensitive to return when A is undertaken than when B is, while the overall payoff from B is higher than when A is undertaken in the unfavorable state, information gathering can be induced.
If q > p 2 , then the manager prefers project A when θ=θ 1 and B when θ=θ 2 so long as s x > s 0 . Therefore, information gathering can be induced by making s x − s 0 large enough so that the value of information to the manager exceeds the cost of information gathering. Nonetheless, it is more costly for the principal to induce information gathering than when she is able to write complete contracts. How large is the loss to the principal from partial contracting, compared to complete contracting? Since this question is irrelevant if she implements (C2) in both contracting environments, we discuss the question in two other cases. First, (C1) is implemented with complete contracting but (C2) is with partial contracting. Such a possibility exists if p 2 ≥q. That the principal implements (C1) in the complete contracting environment implies that her expected payoff V 1 − U C m is larger than V 2 where U C m denotes the manager's equilibrium expected payoff shown in Proposition 1. Since the principal's expected payoff from (C2) is V 2 , her loss from partial contracting in this case is V 1 − V 2 − U Finally, note that the positive rent to the manager when (C1) is implemented is once again due to limited liability. Without limited liability, the principal can set s 0 < 0 and s x > 0, thereby making the manager's equilibrium expected payoff equal to zero. Such (s x , s 0 ) can be found by substituting the binding IC constraint into the manager's expected payoff, which is then set equal to zero:
(1−π)(q−p 2 ) . Thus, as in the complete contracting environment, the principal would prefer centralization to any other organizational structures if limited liability is relaxed and (C1) can be implemented in centralization, i.e., q > p 2 .
Delegation
We start with manager delegation where the principal offers a manager's contract (s x , s 0 ) ∈ 2 + , and the manager offers a worker's contract (w x , w 0 ) = ( /p 1 , 0) by Lemma 1. The manager's ex ante IC constraints can be rearranged as
Furthermore, it is straightforward to see that the first inequality implies the manager's interim IC constraint for the contingency that he observed θ 1 and the second inequality implies that for the other contingency (so long as s x > s 0 which is implied by the first inequality). Rearranging the two inequalities, all the IC constraints for the manager are then reduced to
Comparison of (6) and (7) with (8) and (9) shows how the manager's incentives change in manager delegation. Constraint (8) is the counterpart to (6) in centralization, which ensures that the manager prefers information gathering and optimal project choice to always choosing project A without gathering information. Since the worker is paid only when project A is chosen, the manager needs to pay the worker in both states if he chooses the latter option. Since the worker's payment increases in , larger makes (8) more likely to be satisfied. Note also that, if q > p 2 , then (8) admits a larger set of (s x , s 0 ) than (6). Constraint (9) is the counterpart to (7), which leads the manager to prefer information gathering and optimal project choice to always choosing project B without gathering information. Since the manager does not need to pay the worker with project B, (9) is more likely to be satisfied if is smaller. While (9) admits a smaller set of (s x , s 0 ) than (7), we also note that (7) is slack when (C1) is implemented in centralization.
For future reference, we denote by * the value of for which the above twin incentives are both binding, which is found by setting both (8) and (9) with equality and solving for that equates s x − s 0 in (8) and (9):
The reason for the difference in the manager's IC constraints between centralization and manager delegation is that the manager's contract in delegation includes the payment to the worker, which motivates the manager to gather information for optimal project choice and hire the worker only when doing so benefits him. Such a link between the worker's contract and the manager's incentives is missing in centralization. Authority provides the manager with stronger incentives for information gathering and optimal project choice than in centralization. Thus (C1) can be implemented in manager delegation for a larger set of parameter values than in centralization, as formalized below. 
Proof. In the Appendix.
As for worker delegation, it is intuitively clear that the principal should be worse off compared to centralization in implementing (C1) since double marginalization (explained earlier in the context of complete contracting) continues to exist insofar as the worker designs the manager's contract. The dominance of centralization over worker delegation in the partial contracting environment is discussed fully in Choe and Park (2010) .
Centralization vs. Manager Delegation
We now return to our central question of when the principal can benefit by delegating authority. We first summarize the main findings from the previous sections. Section 4 has shown that there is no reason for the principal to delegate authority to either agent if she can write complete contracts. In Section 5, it was shown that, in the partial contracting environment, centralization continues to dominate worker delegation. However, delegating authority to the manager can potentially benefit the principal compared to centralization. There are two sources of such potential benefits. First, delegation allows the principal to implement an outcome that cannot be implemented in centralization. Specifically, if q≤p 2 , then (C1) cannot be implemented in centralization but it can be in manager delegation. Second, delegation implements the same outcome as in centralization but possibly at lower costs. The latter is the case if q > p 2 . By analyzing these two cases, this section shows when delegation to the manager can dominate centralization. In what follows, we denote the expected payoff from (C1) under centralization in partial contracting by U 
Partial Contracting When q > p 2
When q > p 2 , (C1) can be implemented in both centralization and manager delegation. From Proposition 3 (ii), the principal's expected payoff from (C1) in centralization is
(1 − π)(q − p 2 ) and the principal prefers (C1) to (C2) if and only if U ct p ≥V 2 , or equivalently,
Thus (C1) is more likely to be implemented if x and are larger, and c and π are smaller. Larger x and imply more benefits to using the manager's information for project choice because (C2) involves a suboptimal project choice and inefficient effort provision by the worker in θ 2 . Smaller c means a lower cost of using the manager's information. Smaller π implies that the manager's information is more valuable: if π is so large that choosing project A and inducing work is almost certainly optimal, then the principal is best off implementing (C2) without the manager's information. In manager delegation the manager's expected payoff is U 
If (11) is satisfied so that (C1) can be implemented in centralization, then we can say that manager delegation dominates centralization if and only if U (11) is not satisfied, then the principal implements (C2) in centralization. This case is the same as when q≤p 2 , which is analyzed in the next section.
Proposition 5 Suppose q > p 2 and that the principal implements (C1) in centralization, i.e., (11) holds. Then there exists > * such that manager delegation dominates centralization for all ≤ .
The above dominance result can be understood from how delegation changes the manager's incentives. Specifically, authority entrusts the manager with the payment to the worker thereby creating two opposing incentives for the manager, which are not present in centralization. On the one hand, the option of always choosing project B without information gathering becomes more attractive because it means that he need not pay the worker. On the other hand, the option of always choosing project A without gathering information becomes less attractive because it means that he will have to pay the worker regardless of the state. Compared to centralization, the former makes the deviation of not gathering information more attractive while the latter makes it less attractive. These effects can be seen by comparing the manager's IC constraints in manager delegation with those in centralization, namely, (9) with (7) and (8) with (6), respectively. These effects are proportional to because larger means larger payment to the worker. When q > p 2 , (7) is slack in centralization and (9) is slack in manager delegation. Thus the difference in the cost of implementing (C1) in the two organizational structures essentially hinges on the comparison of (8) and (6). Both constraints ensure that the manager prefers (C1) to always choosing project A without gathering information. As argued above, delegation makes the latter option less attractive: (8) is easier to satisfy than (6). Therefore, if (C1) is implementable in centralization for some (s x , s 0 ) that satisfies (6), then it is implementable in manager delegation with a lower (s x , s 0 ) when is not too large.
The cost reduction is a result of a lower rent for the manager, which is possible because delegation allows the principal to provide more effective incentives to the manager. It is worth noting that, although the manager's contract does not depend on project choice in the partial contracting environment, his payoff in manager delegation depends on project choice through his decision to exercise authority to contract with the worker. Such a link between the manager's payoff and project choice is possible in manager delegation but not in centralization, which the principal can utilize to better design the manager's contract.
Partial Contracting When q≤p 2
We showed above that if q > p 2 , delegating authority to the manager may benefit the principal because it allows her to implement (C1) at a lower cost than in centralization. We now show that if q≤p 2 and ≥ * , the principal may benefit from manager delegation because it allows her to implement an outcome that she cannot in centralization. When q≤p 2 and ≥ * , the principal cannot implement (C1) in centralization; she implements (C2) instead. Since (C2) involves suboptimal project choice and inefficient effort by the worker in θ 2 , the benefit of delegation in this case comes primarily from efficiency. The cost of delegation is the rent that needs to be paid to the manager. We discuss below when the benefit outweighs the cost.
The principal's expected payoff in centralization is V 2 . In manager delegation, Proposition 4 shows that the principal's expected payoff is the second one in (12). Thus the principal's net benefit from manager delegation is
The first and the third terms on the right hand side of (13) are negative while the sign of the second term is indeterminate. It is routinely verified that ∆ can be positive at some parameter values that satisfy Assumptions 1 to 3, q≤p 2 , and ≥ * . For example, when p 1 = 0.9, p 2 = 0.2, q = 0.19, π = 0.5, c = 0.12, x = 100, and = 3, we have * ≈ 1.17 and ∆ ≈ 0.013. We show below how ∆ changes as c, and π change, and hence when the principal is likely to benefit from manager delegation.
A parameter profile is a 7-tuple z = (c, ,
4 be the interior of the set of parameter profiles such that Assumptions 1-3 are satisfied, q≤p 2 , ≥ * , and ∆ > 0. Thus Ξ is a set of parameter values satisfying all our assumptions, over which manager delegation implements (C1) and dominates centralization. The above example shows Ξ = ∅. Given z ∈Ξ, we use z z/z to denote z with its zcomponent replaced by z for z = c, , π. For z = , Assumption 2 places an upper bound¯ z := [πp 1 + (1 − π)p 2 − q]x on for z / ∈Ξtohold.
Let z ∈Ξandconsider changes in c, the manager's cost of gathering information. Since ∆ decreases in c, we must have ∆ > 0 for all z c/c such that c < c. This is intuitively clear because higher c means higher cost of inducing the manager to gather information in manager delegation. Next, consider changes in , the worker's cost of effort. Centralization leads to suboptimal effort choice by the worker since in (C2) the worker works in θ 2 even if his marginal product is less than the cost of work. An increase in magnifies this inefficiency of centralization. Thus, the efficiency benefit of manager delegation can be measured as V 1 − V 2 , which increases as increases:
On the other hand, an increase in also increases the manager's compensation in manager delegation:
It is possible to show that if z ∈Ξ, the efficiency benefit outweighs the compensation cost for all z / such that ≥ . Finally, it can be easily verified from (13) that ∆ is strictly concave in π. This implies that the information rent to the manager is large relative to the value of information to the principal when π is either too small or too large. In these cases, obtaining information has a limited value and thus, the manager is reluctant to gather information. The value of manager's information is larger when π has an intermediate value. In implementing (C2), on the other hand, manager's rent is irrelevant. These observations lead to the next proposition.
Proposition 6: Ξ = ∅. Furthermore, for each z ∈Ξ: (i) There isc z > 0 such that z c/c ∈Ξif and only if c ∈ (0,c z ); (ii) There is z ≥ * such that z / ∈Ξif and only if ∈ ( z ,¯ z ); and (iii) There is (π z ,π z ) ⊂ (0, 1) such that z π/π ∈Ξif and only if π ∈ (π z ,π z ).
We summarize the main findings for the case that q≤p 2 . In centralization, the principal is unable to motivate the manager to gather information. This results in suboptimal project choice and inefficient effort provision by the worker. Manager delegation corrects this inefficiency but at the cost of manager's rent necessary to motivate him to gather and use information for efficient decision-making. Choosing manager delegation instead of centralization, the principal thus trades off the benefits of manager's information against the compensation cost for the manager. The benefits of delegation increase as the manager's information becomes more valuable and the worker's cost of effort increases. The cost of delegation increases as it becomes more costly for the manager to gather information. As a consequence, manager delegation is more likely to dominate centralization if the manager's cost of information gathering is smaller, the worker's effort cost is larger, and the manager's information becomes more valuable. This is in contrast to the case in the previous subsection: When q > p 2 , there is no efficiency loss in centralization. Thus the comparison of centralization and manager delegation was based primarily on how much rent the manager should be given in the two organizational structures.
Conclusion
We studied a model with a principal and two agents, namely, a manager who can acquire and communicate information relevant for project choice, and a worker who exerts effort that affects the return depending on the chosen project. Defining authority as the right to choose a project and contract with the agent who does not directly contract with the principal, we have analyzed the equilibria of various organizational structures in two contracting environments, one in which all the publicly observable variables can be used for contracting purposes (complete contracting) and the other in which only the return from the project is contractible upon (partial contracting). In centralization, the principal retains authority while delegation confers authority to one of the agents.
The central question of this paper is when the principal can benefit from delegation compared to centralization. Our main results can be summarized as follows: Although the principal cannot benefit from delegation in the complete contracting environment, she can in the partial contracting environment when authority is delegated to the manager, but not to the worker.
The benefits from delegating authority to the manager come from two sources. First, when centralization cannot induce the manager to acquire information and hence results in a suboptimal investment decision, delegating authority to the manager can motivate him to acquire information, thereby implementing an optimal investment decision. These efficiency gains from delegation are weighed against the costs of motivating the manager. Beneficial delegation obtains when the benefits exceed the costs, which is more likely if the manager's cost of information acquisition becomes smaller, the manager's information becomes more valuable, and the worker's cost of effort becomes larger. Second, even when centralization can induce information acquisition and implement an optimal investment decision, manager delegation can benefit the principal as it can reduce the rent that the principal needs to pay the manager in centralization. Conferred with the authority to contract with the worker, the manager is made a residual claimant in the subcontracting stage. This enables the principal to disentangle the interlocked incentives between the manager and the worker, thereby reducing the cost of observing the manager's incentive constraints in centralization.
An additional conclusion from this paper is that the delegated agent has more influence upon his own compensation than the other agent does, since the delegated agent assumes residual claim in the subcontracting stage. This, combined with the authority to choose a project, can be viewed as a reasonable portrayal of a corporate hierarchy where top managers, not other stakeholders, are delegated authority, whose key role is to make strategic decisions, and who are often motivated through stock-based compensation. An extension of the current model that can more fruitfully elucidate the nature of incentive pay in multi-tier corporate hierarchies is left for future research. Proof of Proposition 2: Manager delegation: Since there is no reporting by the manager in this case, the principal offers a contract contingent upon the project choice and return, denoted by (s kx , s k0 ) k=A,B , to the manager, who makes a project choice and offers a contract (w Ax , w A0 ) to the worker if he chooses project A. Recall from Lemma 1 that the optimal contract for the worker is (w Ax , w A0 ) = ( /p 1 , 0).
shown that the solution to (5) satisfies this extra constraint (Proposition 1), it follows that the solutions to (5) and (A4) are the same. The only difference is that, in manager delegation, the payment to the manager includes the payment to the worker, which in equilibrium will be passed on to the worker when project A is chosen. This proves that centralization and manager delegation are equivalent in implementing (C1).
Worker delegation: Denote the worker's contract by (w kr ) k,r and the manager's contract by (s i kr ) i,k,r . Since the worker is the residual claimant in his contractual relationship with the manager, if the worker is to induce information gathering and truth-telling from the manager, then he would offer exactly the same contract as that offered by the principal in centralization: s Bx +(1−q)s 2 B0 = ε < c for an arbitrarily small ε > 0. Given the manager's report ofθ 2 , suppose the worker chooses project B. The worker's ex ante expected payoff from this deviation is qw Bx + (1 − q)w B0 − ε. For worker delegation to implement (C1), the worker's payoff in (A5) should be no less than this expected payoff. Moreover, we must have qw Bx + (1 − q)w B0 > 0 because qw Bx + (1 − q)w B0 = 0 would imply that upon receivingθ 2 the worker would benefit by undertaking project A and shirking, thus obtaining a payoff of s 1 A0 = 0, rather than obtaining −˜K < 0 by undertaking B as the equilibrium stipulates. Therefore, the worker's payoff in equilibrium that implements (C1), which we asserted above is no less than qw Bx +(1−q)w B0 −ε for arbitrarily small ε, is strictly positive. Recall that the worker's expected payoff is zero in centralization when (C1) is implemented. Since the manager's equilibrium expected payoff is the same in centralization and worker delegation when (C1) is implemented, the principal is strictly worse off in worker delegation.
Proof of Proposition 4:
In equilibrium that implements (C1), the principal chooses (s x , s 0 ) to minimize the manager's expected payoff subject to (8) and (9). Suppose q≤p 2 . Then (8) and (9) become
by Assumption 1, Assumption 3, ≥ * , and ∆ > 0, proves part (ii) of the Proposition. Finally, it is easy to check that ∂ 2 ∆ ∂π 2 < 0, hence ∆ is strictly concave in π. Since ∆ > 0 at z,∆> 0 also holds as π changes within an interval, say I ⊂ (0, 1). By the same token, the condition ≥ * holds as π changes within an interval, say J ⊂ (0, 1). Let π z be the maximum of inf I, inf J, and the lower bound on π determined by Assumption 2. Letπ z be the minimum of sup I, sup J, and the upper bound on π determined by Assumption 3. This establishes part (iii) of the Proposition.
